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Abstract
In the common law of negligence, an individual breaches the duty of due care if she
fails to act as would a “reasonable man” under the circumstances. A natural question,
first posed by Rubinstein [8], is whether the “reasonable man” can be derived from the
views of actual agents. Rubinstein introduced an axiomatic model and showed that there
does not exist a non-dictatorial aggregation method which satisfies several normatively
appealing properties. I introduce a new model based on a different understanding of the
“reasonable man” and provide a characterization of the “union rule”, the most inclusive
view of reasonableness satisfying a basic Pareto criterion. The union rule requires that a
jury must unanimously agree to find a defendant liable for negligence.
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The “Reasonable Man” and other legal standards. ∗
Alan D. Miller
1 Introduction
In the common law of negligence, an individual breaches the duty of due care if she
fails to act as would a “reasonable man” under the circumstances. A natural question,
first posed by Rubinstein [8], is whether the “reasonable man” can be derived from the
views of actual agents. Rubinstein introduced an axiomatic model and showed that there
does not exist a non-dictatorial aggregation method which satisfies several normatively
appealing properties. I introduce a new model based on a different understanding of the
“reasonable man” and provide a characterization of the “union rule”, the most inclusive
view of reasonableness satisfying a basic Pareto criterion. The union rule requires that a
jury must unanimously agree to find a defendant liable for negligence.
There are two main competing theories of the “reasonable man” requirement in neg-
ligence law. The economic view holds that an individual breaches her duty if she takes
less than the socially optimal amount of precaution. This approach is most commonly
traced back to the opinion of Judge Learned Hand in the seminal case of United States
v. Carroll Towing, and is consequently refereed to as the “Hand Rule”. The traditional
view holds that an individual breaches her duty if she fails to obey certain norms of
reasonable behavior.
The “Hand Rule” approach has been resoundingly accepted by law and economics
movement. It has the nice feature that it is efficient in theory — social welfare will be
maximized if potential tortfeasors treat the costs they impose on others as costs to them-
selves. However, the theory, as adduced in Carroll Towing, measures social welfare by
aggregating the dollar values of resources involved in the decision, an idiosyncratic notion
of social welfare. In a more general framework, social welfare is an aggregation of indi-
vidual preference, and there are many aggregation methods which could be used. None
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is an obvious choice. Arrow [1] showed that no non-dictatorial social welfare function
satisfies a set of very reasonable axioms.
I have found only a single attempt to formally model the “reasonable man” in a so-
cial choice framework. Rubinstein [8] developed a model in which the “reasonable man”
is formed by aggregating “realization functions”, or expectations as to the outcomes of
specific actions, and preferences over outcomes held by individuals in the society. Rubin-
stein required that the “reasonable man” be formed through independent aggregation of
realization functions and preferences and that the “reasonable man” preserve unanimous
agreements with respect to (a) realization of specific actions and (b) induced preferences
over actions, and showed that no non-dictatorial aggregation method satisfies these re-
quirements.1
The traditional approach — concerned with norms of reasonable behavior — is not
directly concerned with efficiency and thus is much more difficult for economists to eval-
uate. The appeal of this approach is primarily in that it conforms with certain common
sense notions of reasonableness.2 To study this approach, I introduce a model in which
the “reasonable man” is the aggregate of several individuals’ norms of reasonable behav-
ior.
In this model, reasonableness is a characteristic of reactions, or actions taken upon
receipt of observable signals. Each individual has an opinion as to which reactions are
reasonable. The model restricts the set of admissible opinions only in that, for each sig-
nal, every individual must believe that some actions are reasonable.3 (If no actions are
reasonable then we are dealing not with negligence but rather with strict liability, a stan-
dard under which reasonableness is not a defense.) These opinions are then aggregated
according to some rule.
I introduce four standard axioms. Pareto requires that the “reasonable man” pre-
serve unanimous agreements that particular reactions are not reasonable. Monotonicity
requires that, if an individual changes his mind and decides that additional reactions
are reasonable, then reactions previously thought reasonable by the “reasonable man”
are still reasonable. Anonymity requires that each individual’s opinion be given equal
weights. Neutrality requires that the aggregation not be conditioned on the names given
to the actions.
There is exactly one rule which satisfies these four axioms. This is the “union rule”,
1Both Arrow [1] and Rubinstein [8] assume a reasonably rich domain of admissible preferences. If the
domain is restricted these results do not necessarily hold. Law and economics researchers often restrict
their analyses to environments where preferences are quasi-linear with respect to money. The extent
to which their results are applicable in broader environments is a matter of debate and probably varies
across contexts.
2In contrast, the “Hand Rule” requires the “reasonable man” to maximize social welfare at the
expense of her own. Law and economics scholars generally assume that individuals would not behave in
this manner when they have the ability to externalize costs were it not for the threat of damages.
3As explained below, the technical requirement is that, for each signal, the set of actions must be of
positive measure.
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in which a response is deemed reasonable if at least one agent considers it reasonable.
In the case of negligence, the union rule requires a jury to unanimously agree to find
a defendant liable. This corresponds to the unanimous jury rule, used in much of the
United States.4
1.1 Other Legal Standards
The model introduced in this paper is applicable to a broader set of problems than
understanding the “reasonable man” of negligence. The “reasonable man” is found in
many places in the common law, such in the law of intentional torts, where an unwanted
touching is a battery only if it would be deemed offensive by the “reasonable man”, and in
criminal law, where a homicide is excused on the grounds of self-defense if the defendant
had a reasonable fear of imminent death or severe bodily harm.
The “reasonable man” is the most prominent of several standards of behavior found
in the common law. Other standards include the stricter “fiduciary duty” and the more
lenient “business judgement rule”.
In each of these cases there is a range of activity which meets the standard. Each
person has an opinion as to the set of actions included in that range. The opinions would
change if we were to consider a different standard of behavior. The formal structure of
the model, however, would remain intact. The axioms presented are equally desirable
regardless of the standard under consideration. Thus the argument presented for using
the union rule to aggregate the “reasonable man” also applies to using the union rule to
aggregate opinions regarding, for example, fiduciary duties.
1.2 Reasonableness as a matter of law.
The law distinguishes between reasonableness “as a matter of fact” and “as a matter
of law”. Decisions about the former are usually made by a jury and do not create
precedents for future cases, while decisions about the latter are made by judges and are
valid precedents for future cases. This paper is primarily concerned with understanding
reasonableness (or other standards) as a matter of fact. The model reflects the idea that
juries are required to provide a collective judgement about facts, but are not expected
to provide a logical defense of their decisions.
Judges, unlike juries, are expected to logically defend their decisions on matters of
law. The problem of aggregating judgements in multi-member courts was first raised
4In civil cases, the unanimity rule is used in Federal courts, in the District of Columbia, and in twenty-
seven states out of fifty. In criminal cases, the unanimity rule is used everywhere but Puerto Rico. The
correspondence is not perfect, however. The rule generally requires that a jury must unanimously agree
to find for either the plaintiff or the defendant. The extent to which mistrials are a victory for the
defense is a matter of debate.
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by Kornhauser and Sager [5], who demonstrated that the use of majority rule may lead
to incoherent legal judgements. Their insight has since been generalized into the wider
problem of “judgement aggregation,” which has focused on the extent to which opinions
about the elements of a law can be aggregated consistently with the conclusions derived
from those opinions. The first formal impossibility result is due to List and Pettit [6],
who showed that, in general, there is no anonymous consistent aggregation method. For
characterizations of non-dictatorial consistent aggregation methods, see work by Nehring
and Puppe [7] and by Dokow and Holzman [3].
2 The Model
2.1 Notation and the Model
There is a set N ≡ {1, ..., n} of agents. The space of actions is denoted by (A,Σ, µ),
where A is the set of actions, Σ is the σ-algebra of subsets of actions, and µ is a measure
on (A,Σ). The space (A,Σ) is assumed to be isomorphic to ([0, 1],B), where such B
is the set of Borel subsets of [0, 1]. I assume that µ is countably additive, non-atomic,
non-negative, and finite.5 Let A ≡ {F ∈ Σ : µ (F ) > 0} be the set of subsets of A of
positive measure.
Let Ω ≡ {ω1, ..., ωk, ...} denote a finite or countable set of signals.6
A reaction (ω, α) ∈ Ω × A is a pair of a signal and an action. Each individual has
an opinion as to which reactions are reasonable.
A view of reasonableness is a mapping Ri : Ω → A from signals to subsets of A
of positive measure. The requirement that the signals must map to subsets of positive
measure reflects the idea that reasonableness is not perfection but a range of behavior.
It must be possible for individuals to find the reasonable actions if they are to choose
one. The collection of all views is denoted R. For any two views Ri, R′i ∈ R, Ri @ R′i if
Ri(ω) ⊂ R′i(ω) for all ω ∈ Ω.
For each i ∈ N there exists an element Ri ∈ R. A profile of views is a vector
R ∈ Rn. A reasonableness rule f : RN → R is a mapping from a profiles to the social
view of reasonableness, which will also be denoted R0.
2.2 Axioms
The first axiom, Pareto, requires the social view to consider a reaction unreasonable if it is
not considered reasonable by any member of the society. This axiom excludes degenerate
5The space of actions is taken from the model of non-atomic games studied in [2] and [4].
6A signal can be thought of as description of the state of the world which precedes an action. Signals
are verifiable.
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rules, under which some reactions are deemed reasonable regardless of the opinions.7
Pareto: For any (ω, α) ∈ Ω× A such that α /∈ Ri(ω) for all i ∈ N , α /∈ R0(ω).
Consider two profiles which are identical except that, in the second profile, one in-
dividual changes her opinion and decides that additional reactions are reasonable. The
second axiom, monotonicity, requires that any reaction considered reasonable by the
social view in the first profile is also considered reasonable in the second. This axiom ex-
cludes plurality rules, under which, for each signal, the reactions with the highest number
of supporters are deemed reasonable.
Monotonicity: If Ri @ R∗i for all i ∈ N , then f(R) @ f(R∗).
The principle of anonymity requires all agents’ views to be treated equally. Indi-
viduals’ names are switched through a permutation pi of N . For a given permutation,
pi(i) is the new name of the individual formerly known as i. For a given profile R,
piR ≡ (Rpi(1), ..., Rpi(n)) is the profile which results once names are switched. The third
axiom, anonymity, requires that permutations of the agents’ names do not affect whether
certain reactions are deemed reasonable. This axiom excludes dictatorships, under which
a pre-selected individual decides which reactions are reasonable.
Anonymity: For every permutation pi of N , f(R) = f(piR)
The principle of neutrality is similar. It requires that a reasonableness rule not treat
some actions differently from others on the basis of their names, but only on the basis
of the views. Let Φµ be the set of all automorphisms of (A,Σ) which preserve the
measure µ. Actions’ names switched through an automorphism φ ∈ Φµ. For a given
profile R, φR ≡ (φ(R1), ..., φ(Rn)) is the profile where the actions’ names are switched.
This excludes rules which consider a particular reaction unreasonable regardless of the
opinions.
Neutrality: For every automorphism φ ∈ Φµ, φ (f(R)) = f(φR).
2.3 The Union Rule
Under the “union rule”, a reaction is considered reasonable if it is considered reasonable
by at least one individual.
Union Rule: For every ω ∈ Ω, α ∈ R0(ω) if α ∈ Ri(ω) for some i ∈ N .
7The examples provided in this section are not meant as an exhaustive list of all rules excluded by
these axioms.
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The union rule is the only reasonableness rule which satisfies all four axioms..
Theorem 2.1 The union rule is the only reasonableness rule which satisfies Pareto,
monotonicity, anonymity, and neutrality. Moreover, all four axioms are independent.
Proof : Let R ∈ RN . By the definition of Pareto, for all ω ∈ Ω, if α /∈ Ri(ω) for all
i ∈ N , then α /∈ R0(ω). To prove the claim I must show that if α ∈ Ri(ω) for some




Let R˜ be a profile such that: (1) αˆ ∈ R˜1(ωˆ), (2) R˜i(ωk) ∩ R˜j(ωl) = ∅ unless i = j
and k = l, (3) µ(R˜i(ωk)) =
ε
2k+1n
for all i ∈ N and ωk ∈ Ω, and (4) R˜i @ Ri for all i ∈ N .
Anonymity and neutrality imply that R˜(ω) = ∪i∈N R˜i(ω) for all ω ∈ Ω.
To prove this, suppose, contrariwise, that α˙ ∈ R˜1(ω˙) but that α˙ /∈ R˜0(ω˙) It follows
from neutrality that R˜1(ω˙)∩ R˜0(ω˙) = ∅. From neutrality and anonymity it follows that,
for all i ∈ N , R˜i(ω˙) ∩ R˜0(ω˙) = ∅, which together with Pareto implies that R˜0(ωˆ) = ∅.
But this is a contradiction, as {∅} /∈ A .
Thus αˆ ∈ R˜0(ωˆ). By monotonicity, that R˜i @ Ri for all i ∈ N implies that f(R˜) @
f(R), and therefore, αˆ ∈ R0(ωˆ). This proves the claim.
The independence of the axioms is proved in the appendix.
3 Conclusion
I have introduced a new model of the “reasonable man” and other legal standards, and
have shown that the union rule is the only rule to satisfy four standard axioms: Pareto,
monotonicity, anonymity, and neutrality. If this model is applied to jury decisions, the
union rule corresponds to the unanimity rule found in much of the United States.
3.1 Changing the number of alternatives
In this model the set of possible actions (A) is assumed to be uncountable. An alternative
approach would be to change the model so that A is a finite set and A ≡ 2A \∅ is the
set of non-empty subsets of A. The axioms would remain the same except that the
µ-preserving automorphisms in the neutrality axiom would be replaced with ordinary
permutations.
Theorem 2.1 would not hold in the finite case. The reason for this is that rules could
be conditioned on the case where individuals each select a very small number of actions.
For example, the rule which uses plurality rule when each individual selects a singleton
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(for each ω) and the union rule in all other cases would satisfy the axioms. It would be
possible to eliminate these special rules, however, with the introduction of a replication
axiom which would require the result to be invariant to replications of the set of actions.
3.2 Fixed Quota Rules
Under a fixed quota rule, a reaction is deemed reasonable if and only if q or more indi-
viduals consider that reaction to be reasonable. A fixed quota rule corresponds to the
jury rule where n− q + 1 jurors must agree to find liability for negligence.
Fixed Quota Rules: There is a fixed number q ∈ [1, n], such that, for every ω ∈ Ω,
α ∈ R0(ω) if |{i ∈ N : α ∈ Ri(ω)}| ≥ q.
In the case where q = 1 this corresponds to the union rule. For the case q > 1, these
rules are not well defined because it is possible that, for some signals, no two individuals
agree that any particular actions are reasonable. In that case, the set of reasonable
actions would be empty, and this violates the requirement that that set be of positive
measure.
3.3 Reasonableness as a matter of law.
This paper is focused on understanding jury decisions about reasonableness “as a matter
of fact” and not court decisions about reasonableness “as a matter of law”. In practice
a jury may need to take the latter into account in the form of a pre-existing judicial
decision which restricts the set of actions they are allowed to consider reasonable. It
is possible to incorporate this into the model by allowing the relevant set of actions to
change for each signal ω. Formally, this would require replacing the set of actions with a
vector of sets (Aω)ω∈Ω. While results do not generally transfer across these environments,
Theorem 2.1 would remain unchanged.
Appendices
A Independence of the Axioms
Claim 1 The Pareto, monotonicity, anonymity, and neutrality axioms are independent.
Proof : I present four rules. Each violates one axiom while satisfying the remaining three.
This is sufficient to prove the claim.
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Rule 1: Consider the degenerate rule in which R0(ω) = A for all ω ∈ Ω and all
R ∈ RN . This satisfies montonicity, anonymity, and neutrality but violates Pareto.
Rule 2: Consider the rule in which α ∈ R0(ω) if |{i ∈ N : α ∈ Ri(ω)}| ≥ 2 or if
|{i ∈ N : α ∈ Ri(ω)}| = 1 and there is no α′ ∈ A such that |{i ∈ N : α′ ∈ Ri(ω)}| ≥ 2.
This satisfies Pareto, anonymity, and neutrality but violates montonicity.
Rule 3: Consider the rule in which R0(ω) = R1(ω) for all ω ∈ Ω and all R ∈ RN .
This satisfies Pareto, monotonicity, and neutrality but violates anonymity.
Rule 4: Let α∗ ∈ A. Consider the rule in which R0(ω) =
⋃
i∈N Ri(ω) ∪ {α∗} \ {α∗}
for all ω ∈ Ω and all R ∈ RN . This satisfies Pareto, monotonicity, and anonymity but
not neutrality.
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